Security-first skill vetting for AI agents. Use this skill to analyze and assess the safety of skills from external sources before installation.
Use BEFORE installing any skill from:
clawhub install )Trigger phrases:
These patterns indicate malicious intent. Do NOT install skills containing these.
Command Execution:
curl ... | bash # Remote code execution
curl ... | sh # Remote code execution
wget ... -O - | sh # Remote code execution
eval "$(...)" # Arbitrary code execution
exec "$(cmd)" # Arbitrary code execution
Privilege Escalation:
sudo ... # Requesting root access
chmod 777 ... # Overly permissive
chmod +x ... # Making scripts executable
chown root ... # Changing ownership to root
Data Exfiltration:
curl -X POST ... -d @/etc/passwd # Sending sensitive files
curl ... -d "$HOME/.ssh" # Sending SSH keys
nc -e /bin/sh ... # Reverse shell
System Destruction:
rm -rf / # Delete everything
rm -rf ~ # Delete home directory
rm -rf /* # Delete all files
:(){ :|:& };: # Fork bomb
These patterns may be legitimate but require context. Review carefully.
Environment Access:
$HOME, $USER, $PATH # Environment variables
cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa # SSH key access
cat ~/.bashrc # Shell config access
Network Operations:
curl ... # May send data externally
wget ... # May download malicious code
nc ... # Netcat - potential backdoor
Package Installation:
pip install ... # Could install malicious package
npm install ... # Could install malicious package
brew install ... # Could install malicious package
Hidden Files:
. # Files starting with dot
touch ~/.hidden # Creating hidden files
Obfuscated Code:
base64.b64decode("...") # Decoding hidden code
exec(base64.b64decode(...)) # Executing hidden code
__import__('...') # Dynamic import
These are normal operations in skills:
# From ClawHub (inspect without installing)
clawhub inspect <slug>
# From GitHub
git clone <repo> /tmp/skill-review
Use the vetting script:
python3 scripts/vet_skill.py <skill-directory>
For flagged items, manually review:
The vetting script performs automated analysis:
# Basic scan
python3 scripts/vet_skill.py /path/to/skill
# Detailed output
python3 scripts/vet_skill.py /path/to/skill --verbose
# Output to file
python3 scripts/vet_skill.py /path/to/skill --output report.md
The script outputs:
┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Is there a critical │
│ red flag? │
└──────────────────┬──────────────────┘
│
┌─────────┴─────────┐
│ Yes │ No
▼ ▼
┌─────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐
│ BLOCK │ │ Any warnings? │
│ │ └────────┬────────┘
└─────────┘ │
┌──────────┴──────────┐
│ Yes │ No
▼ ▼
┌────────────────┐ ┌─────────┐
│ Can warnings │ │ PASS │
│ be explained? │ └─────────┘
└───────┬────────┘
│
┌───────┴───────┐
│ Yes │ No
▼ ▼
┌─────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ CAUTION │ │ BLOCK │
└─────────┘ └──────────┘
> "Trust but verify" - Even trusted sources can be compromised
The goal is not to block all skills, but to:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ YOUR MACHINE │
├──────────────────┬──────────────────┬───────────────────────────────┤
│ │ │ │
│ 🚫 MY FILES │ ✅ SHARED FILES │ 🧠 AGENT BRAIN │
│ (禁区) │ (协作区) │ (代理记忆区) │
│ │ │ │
│ • Personal data │ • Shared docs │ • MEMORY.md │
│ • SSH keys │ • Project files │ • Daily notes │
│ • Passwords │ • Specs │ • Learning records │
│ • Private repos │ • Notes │ • Task logs │
│ • Credentials │ • Brain folder │ • Workspace files │
│ │ │ │
│ ⛔ NO ACCESS │ 🤝 COLLABORATE │ 🧠 FULL ACCESS │
│ │ │ │
└──────────────────┴──────────────────┴───────────────────────────────┘
🚫 MY FILES (禁区)
✅ SHARED FILES (协作区)
🧠 AGENT BRAIN (代理记忆区)
~/.openclaw/workspace/重要:检测 + 告知 = 由用户判断
而不是自动拦截!让用户来做最终决定。
| 检测到行为 | 级别 | 处理方式 |
|---|---|---|
| ----------- | ------ | --------- |
| 访问 MY FILES 区域 | 🚨 SEVERE | 告知用户,等待确认 |
| 跨区域数据传输 | ⚠️ WARNING | 提醒用户,说明风险 |
| 在 SHARED FILES 操作 | ✅ INFO | 正常,仅记录 |
| 在 AGENT BRAIN 操作 | ✅ INFO | 正常,仅记录 |
MY FILES 区域检测:
# 私人数据路径
~/.ssh/ # SSH keys
~/.gnupg/ # GPG keys
~/.config/ # Config files (部分)
~/Documents/ # 私人文档 (用户定义)
~/Desktop/ # 桌面文件
~/Library/ # macOS Library
/etc/ # System files
# 私人服务
Dropbox/ # 个人 Dropbox
私人 GitHub repos # 非共享仓库
SHARED FILES 区域检测:
# 共享工作区
~/.openclaw/workspace/ # OpenClaw 工作区
~/Projects/shared/ # 共享项目
用户指定的共享目录 # 由用户定义
AGENT BRAIN 区域检测:
# 代理记忆区
~/.openclaw/workspace/MEMORY.md
~/.openclaw/workspace/memory/
~/.openclaw/workspace/AGENTS.md
~/.openclaw/workspace/IDENTITY.md
~/.openclaw/workspace/USER.md
当检测到边界违规时,告知用户:
🚨 边界警告:检测到访问 MY FILES 区域
技能尝试访问:~/.ssh/id_rsa
区域类型:私人密钥存储
这可能是:
1. 恶意窃取私钥
2. 合法的 SSH 操作需求
请确认是否允许此操作?
[ ] 允许一次
[ ] 允许并记住
[ ] 拒绝
This skill was created to protect Vivi大管家 and 糖门门主 from malicious skills.
共 1 个版本