Build secure, agentic, long-running workflows in TypeScript. Run them anywhere Node runs.


Most LLM workflow tools make security an afterthought. Agents call arbitrary tools, read arbitrary files, hit arbitrary URLs — because the framework has no model for preventing it. When something goes wrong (prompt injection, runaway loops, accidental secret exfiltration), you find out after the fact.
skelm is built the other way around. Every agent step starts with zero privileges. Filesystem roots, network hosts, MCP servers, CLI binaries, secrets — each is declared upfront in the step definition. Anything not declared is denied at dispatch, before the backend ever starts. The audit log records every privileged action in a tamper-evident chain so you can always reconstruct what happened.
The rest of the design follows from that principle:
.ts modules you type-check, refactor, test, and version like any other code. No DSL, no YAML, no JSON config.code() for deterministic logic, llm() for single inference calls, agent() for full multi-turn loops. Mix them freely in a single pipeline.parallel, forEach, branch, loop, wait, and nested pipelines are core primitives.skelm audit query.# 1. Install the CLI
npm install -g skelm
# 2. Scaffold a project
skelm init my-bot && cd my-bot && npm install
# 3. Run your first workflow
skelm run workflows/hello.workflow.mts --input '{"name":"world"}'
# 4. Stand up the gateway (long-running, handles scheduling + agent steps)
skelm gateway start
Use this skill when:
.workflow.mts / .workflow.ts / *.pipeline.mts file)AgentPermissions, skelm.config.ts, MCP wiring, backend setupA pipeline is a TypeScript file that exports a pipeline() call:
import { code, llm, agent, pipeline } from 'skelm'
import { z } from 'zod'
export default pipeline({
id: 'my-workflow',
description: 'What this pipeline does.',
input: z.object({ task: z.string() }),
output: z.object({ result: z.string() }),
steps: [ /* Step[] */ ],
finalize: (ctx) => ctx.steps['last-step'] as { result: string },
})
Step kinds: code · llm · agent · check · parallel · forEach · branch · loop · wait · pipelineStep · idempotent · invoke
Import everything from 'skelm'. Access prior step outputs via ctx.steps['step-id'].
code() — deterministic logiccode({
id: 'parse',
run: (ctx) => ({ value: (ctx.input as { raw: string }).raw.trim() }),
// New in v0.4.3:
workspace?: WorkspaceConfig // provisions ctx.workspace (same modes as agent())
continueOnError?: boolean // record failure, continue to next step (default false)
})
llm() — single-shot inferencellm({
id: 'classify',
backend: 'openai',
prompt: (ctx) => `Classify: ${(ctx.input as { text: string }).text}`,
output: z.object({ label: z.string(), confidence: z.number() }),
maxTokens: 512,
})
agent() — full agentic loop (default-deny)agent({
id: 'implement',
backend: 'pi',
prompt: (ctx) => `Implement ticket ${(ctx.input as { id: string }).id}. Return JSON {prUrl}.`,
permissions: {
allowedTools: ['gh.*'],
allowedExecutables: ['git'],
allowedMcpServers: ['github'],
fsRead: ['./'],
fsWrite: ['./src/'],
networkEgress: { allowHosts: ['api.github.com'] },
},
workspace: { mode: 'ephemeral', cleanup: 'on-run-end' },
output: z.object({ prUrl: z.string() }),
maxTurns: 20,
})
> Default-deny: every AgentPermissions field defaults to deny when omitted. An agent with no permissions block cannot call tools, read files, execute binaries, attach MCP servers, or make network requests.
| Dimension | Field | Default |
|---|---|---|
| --- | --- | --- |
| Tool | allowedTools / deniedTools | deny |
| Executable | allowedExecutables | deny |
| MCP server | allowedMcpServers | deny |
| Skill | allowedSkills | deny |
| Secret | allowedSecrets | deny |
| Network | networkEgress | deny |
| FS read | fsRead | deny |
| FS write | fsWrite | deny |
| Approval gate | approval | — |
Composition is intersection-only. Project defaults → named profile → step-level. Each layer can only narrow, never widen.
Named profiles in skelm.config.ts:
defaults: {
permissionProfiles: {
'github-write': {
allowedExecutables: ['git'],
allowedTools: ['gh.*'],
allowedMcpServers: ['github'],
fsRead: ['./'],
fsWrite: ['./'],
networkEgress: { allowHosts: ['api.github.com'] },
},
},
}
Apply: permissions: { profile: 'github-write', allowedTools: ['gh.create_pr'] }
Full permissions reference: {baseDir}/references/permissions.md
my-project/
├── skelm.config.mts # Required for gateway + agent steps (.mts = always ESM)
├── workflows/
│ └── hello.workflow.mts # One pipeline per file (.mts canonical; .ts also accepted)
├── package.json # { "type": "module", "dependencies": { "skelm": "^0.4.3", "zod": "^4" } }
└── tsconfig.json
Scaffold a new pipeline from template:
bash {baseDir}/scripts/new-pipeline.sh my-pipeline "What it does"
bash {baseDir}/scripts/new-pipeline.sh my-pipeline "What it does" --agent
Config reference: {baseDir}/references/config.md
.env / config.env loading (v0.4.3)The CLI merges and config.env into process.env at startup. Precedence: process.env > .env > config.env. Subprocess steps (ctx.exec, agents, MCP servers) inherit the merged env. Add .env to .gitignore for secrets; use config.env inside skelm.config.mts for non-secret defaults like model names and base URLs.
skelm run <workflow.ts> --input '<json>' # run once
skelm list # discover pipelines
skelm describe <id> --format mermaid # visualize
skelm history --last 10 # run history
skelm validate <workflow.ts> # static preflight
skelm logs # stream gateway logs
skelm audit query --run <id> # tamper-evident audit trail
skelm schedule add <id> --cron '0 * * * *' # schedule
skelm gateway start # long-running gateway
Exit codes: 0 ok · 1 CLI error · 2 schema validation · 3 run failed · 4 cancelled · 5 wait timeout · 6 permission denied · 7 step timeout
Full CLI reference: {baseDir}/references/cli.md
The gateway owns permission resolution, enforcement, secret resolution, audit log, approval gating, trigger dispatch, and registry management.
Never write permission enforcement in pipeline or step code. Pipelines are the user layer. The gateway is the trust layer.
skelm gateway start
skelm gateway status
skelm gateway install --systemd # systemd unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/skelm-gateway.service
Gateway reference: {baseDir}/references/gateway.md
networkEgress: 'allow' in a step when the project default is deny has no effect. Intersection always wins.input/output are validated at run boundaries; omitting them skips validation silently.agent() with an unregistered backend — step fails at runtime if backend references an id with no matching entry in config backends: or instances:. The pi SDK backend must be in instances:.parallel() — sibling ids must be unique within the parallel block.dist/ — never edit generated files. Run pnpm build to regenerate.{baseDir}/references/pipeline-authoring.md — all builders, control flow, context shape, retry{baseDir}/references/agent-step.md — agent() signature, backends, workspace modes, MCP{baseDir}/references/permissions.md — full permission model, TrustEnforcer, testing{baseDir}/references/config.md — skelm.config.ts shape, backends, MCP entries{baseDir}/references/gateway.md — gateway lifecycle, HTTP surface, audit log, systemd{baseDir}/references/cli.md — complete CLI reference with all flags and exit codes共 2 个版本